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Private Value Determinations and the
Potential Effect on the Future of Research
and Development
Amy L. Landers*
INTRODUCTION
Although the promise of an emerging patent market is
thought to provide future benefits to invention, innovation, and
the public, this Article examines the possibility that the
aggregate influence of this activity could instead destabilize
patent values in a manner that mirrors the “bubble” phenomenon
that occurred in certain markets in the past. To the extent that
this occurs, this would have negative consequences for the future
of investment in research, development, and innovation.1
Although a patent market has been said to be in the
emerging stages, none exists at this time.2 The attributes of a
well-functioning market are not present, including accepted
methods for determining price, a system to connect
buyers/licensees with sellers/licensors, liquidity, and minimal
transaction costs. If such a market becomes established, it might
lead to rational private ordering for intellectual property asset
trades. In theory, such a market might facilitate information
sharing, collaboration, commercialization, and invention. Yet
there are reasons to consider that a socially desirable market
might not materialize as anticipated.

Professor of Law, Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law.
Based on the current state of available information, it is not possible to fully
evaluate whether there is an overall distortion for patent licensing. At present, there is
only interstitial pricing information available. Patent assertion entities do not disclose
specifics, license agreements are largely confidential, and there are few comparators.
Indeed, it appears that some entities go to great lengths to shield the confidentiality of the
terms of these agreements. See Patrick Anderson, Micron Retains Interest in Round Rock
Patent Monetization Proceeds, GAMETIME IP (May 9, 2012), http://gametimeip.com/2012/
05/09/micron-retains-interest-in-round-rock-patent-monetization-proceeds.
2 See Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market,
36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 257 (2007); see also Lucia Karina Alvarado, The Patent Transactions
Market – Established and Emerging Business Models 7 (2010) (Master’s thesis, Chalmers
University of Technology) (on file with Department of Technology Management and
Economics, Chalmers University of Technology).
*
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As Hyman Minsky has theorized, some markets become
subject to a form of instability that leads to incoherence.3 This
might occur even in the absence of any mismanagement, fraud,
or wrongful conduct. Damaging volatility can occur due to
frictions, which can include that which exists between the private
wealth-maximizing interests of individuals on one hand, and the
public interest on the other. Further, the impact of such
incoherence can create second-order effects that reach outside the
core activity in which this incoherence occurs. This can take any
of numerous forms, up to and including impacts that harm
employment, invention, investment, and innovation.
First, this Article draws on the existing literature to
establish a working definition of bubbles, both economic and
non-economic. Second, these principles are applied to the case of
Bitcoin to illustrate how these theories might be applied to an
asset that lacks widely accepted, objective price anchors. Third,
this work considers how these principles might be applied to an
emerging market for patents.
I. THE IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE OF BUBBLES
A. Economic Bubbles: A Brief Primer
The field of neoclassic economics assumes that agents are
rational and markets are efficient. Under this theory,
well-informed arbitragers correct mispricing when it occurs.4 In
this theoretical world, the individual pursuit of self-interest is
said to best serve the public interest by maximizing welfare.5
Under economic theory, the price of an asset has a rational
connection to future cash flows, subject to reasonable variations.6
The behavior that is responsible for bubbles is at odds with these
assumptions. Episodes that range from the Dutch tulip mania in
the 1630s up to the recent bursting of the subprime mortgage
market shed doubt on the idea that the rationality assumption
can be applied to all markets. To explain this behavior,
economists have turned to psychology, sociology, and political

See HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY 11 (2008).
See Dilip Abreu & Markus K. Brunnermeier, Bubbles and Crashes, 71
ECONOMETRICA 173 (2003).
5 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Invisible Hand and Modern Welfare Economics 1 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3641, 1991). The field of economics’ limited
sphere of influence on the operation of the law has been explored by others. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
103−40 (1979).
6 See Jeremy J. Siegel, What Is an Asset Price Bubble? An Operational Definition,
9 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 11, 12 (2003); see also PETER M. GARBER, FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES: THE
FUNDAMENTALS OF EARLY MANIAS 4 (2000).
3
4
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science to formulate a literature that examines the bubble
phenomenon.
The richest source of this literature focuses on the pricing
bubble, which is defined as “an upward price movement over an
extended [range] . . . that then implodes.”7 An alternative
definition holds that bubble pricing is “a sharp rise in [the] price
of an asset or a range of assets in a continuous process, with the
initial rise generating expectations of further rises and attracting
new buyers—generally speculators interested in profits from
trading in the asset rather than its use or earning capacity.”8 The
key points of commonality underlying these descriptions is that a
bubble occurs when the price of the asset is higher than justified
by its intrinsic value when referenced against its underlying
fundamentals. For a typical commodity, fundamental price
drivers might include supply scarcity, increased demand,
changes in consumer income levels, overall consumer confidence,
and employment levels. In contrast, bubble asset prices are
driven by the irrational expectation that the asset’s price will
continue to rise merely because prices have done so in the past.
As an example, “[d]uring a housing price bubble, homebuyers
think that a home that they would normally consider too
expensive for them is now an acceptable purchase because they
will be compensated by significant further price increases.”9 If
the home is resold, this anticipation drives the sales price
upward. Where these expectations are prevalent within a
substantial portion of the market, all home prices rise. Where
prices consistently and significantly depart above a level that can
be sustained in the long term, in the absence of an alternative
explanation, a bubble exists. Inevitably, the supply of buyers that
are willing or able to pay ever-increasing prices disappears.
Bubbles can form if buyers are willing to pay an increase
based on the mere expectation of turning a profit through
resale.10 In the end, these successive price increases are revealed
to be unsustainable, for example when “people buy houses
because they expect home prices to keep rising at a pace that
would eventually leave nobody able to buy a first home.”11 Such
cycles cannot manifest profits over the long term, because these
7 CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND
CRASHES: A HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISES 29 (5th ed., 2005).
8 1 PALGRAVE MACMILLIAN, THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 281
(John Eatwell et al. eds., 1998).
9 Karl E. Case & Robert J. Shiller, Is There a Bubble in the Housing Market?,
2003 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, no. 2, at 299, 299.
10 See id.
11 Paul Krugman, Things that Aren’t Bubbles, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2012, 9:54 AM),
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/22/things-that-arent-bubbles.
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circumstances are akin to the final phase of a Ponzi scheme,
where the pricing structure is doomed to collapse when the
supply of buyers disappears. Certainly, a bubble is not formed
simply because of a dramatic price increase. As economists
Kindleberger and Aliber explain, a sharp rise in oil prices based
on legitimate concerns over political instability in the Middle
East is an increase driven by anticipated scarcity, which is a
legitimate price driver.12 Even if the oil shortage never
materializes, the price rise is not considered subject to bubble
pricing because the initial concern is a traditional price driver.13
If markets are populated with rational actors, why do
bubbles occur? Economist Robert J. Shiller, who coined the
phrase “irrational exuberance,” proffers this explanation:
[It is] a situation in which news of price increases spurs investor
enthusiasm, which spreads by psychological contagion from person to
person, in the process amplifying stories that might justify the price
increases and bringing in a larger and larger class of investors, who,
despite doubts about the real value of an investment, are drawn to it
partly through envy of others’ successes and partly through a
gambler’s excitement.14

As one source described, “There is nothing as disturbing to one’s
well-being and judgment as to see a friend get rich. Unless it is to
see a non-friend get rich.”15 The apparent success stories of the
early entrants, sometimes spread through the media, help fuel
others’ interest in participating.16 Yet the circumstances that
create bubbles are challenging to specify. Although Shiller’s
assessment seems to ring true in numerous examples of past
bubble markets, others have formed despite the presence of
buyer optimism.17

12 See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND
CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 14 (6th ed., 2011).
13 See GARBER, supra note 6, at 124 (“Before we relegate a speculative event to the
fundamentally inexplicable or bubble category . . . we should exhaust the reasonable
economic explanations.”).
14 ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 2 (2nd ed. 2005); see also
KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 12, at 30 (describing the actions of speculators in
“irrational exuberance” and how speculation leads “from normal, rational behavior
to . . . ‘mania’ or a ‘bubble’”).
15 KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 12, at 30 (quoting JAMES B. STEWART, DEN
OF THIEVES 97 (1992)).
16 See SHILLER, supra note 14, at 105 (“[T]he news media are fundamental
propagators of speculative price movements through their efforts to make news
interesting to their audience.”).
17 See generally Jörg Oechssler, Carsten Schmidt & Wendelin Schnedler, On the
Ingredients for Bubble Formation: Informed Traders and Communication, 35 J. ECON.
DYNAMICS & CONTROL 1831 (2011). “[B]ubbles occur even in a very austere environment
without any of the features mentioned by Shiller.” Jörg Oechssler et al., On the
Ingredients for Bubble Formation: Informed Traders and Communication 2 (University of
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Where it exists, irrational exuberance does not have to be
uniform across an entire population to fuel a bubble’s creation.
Mispricing can be attributed to those who “generally seem to
form expectations by extrapolating past price patterns and by
myopically updating these expectations based on their own
forecast errors in the previous period or market.”18 However,
other participants include sophisticated sources that “understand
the [asset’s] fundamental value, but speculate on being able to
resell assets they own for a price in excess of fundamental
value.”19 These participants, who are aware of the pricing
vulnerabilities, remain in the market to ride the bubble to
extract profits as long as possible, hoping to exit prior to the
crash.
Thus, certain bubble markets are populated with two types
of investors: insiders and outsiders.20 According to this theory,
“[t]he insiders destabilize by driving the price up and then sell at
or near the top to the outsiders.”21 Yet timing one’s exit is
notoriously difficult, even for those with experience. As one
veteran manager of an $8.2 billion fund responded, when asked
the reasons that he failed to exit the Internet stock bubble earlier
than he did, “We thought it was the eighth inning, and it was the
ninth.”22
Further, economist Edward Miller points out that, under
certain circumstances, a mere difference of opinion about an
asset’s valuation can be sufficient to skew prices off of a rational
fundamental mark.23 Although the reasons are complex, at a
general level optimists prefer to invest despite high prices,
because such buyers anticipate further growth.24 Those with
rational expectations, or pessimistic ones, decline to invest at all.
Miller theorizes that this imbalance of preferences among buyers
and sellers leads the asset to become overvalued because the
Heidelberg, Working Paper, 2007), available at http://www.uni-heidelberg.de/md/awi/pro
fessuren/with2/oss.pdf.
18 Stefan Palan, A Review of Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Asset Markets,
27 J. ECON. SURVEYS 570, 574 (2013); see also Abreu & Brunnermeier, supra note 4, at
173.
19 Palan, supra note 18, at 575; see also Abreu & Brunnermeier, supra note 4, at 174.
20 KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 12, at 46.
21 Id.
22 Abreu & Brunnermeier, supra note 4, at 175 (quoting Stanley Druckenmiller,
manager of George Soros’s fund).
23 See Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. FIN.
1151, 1155 (1977); see also Oechssler, Schmidt & Schnedler, supra note 17, at 1832
(demonstrating that the mere possibility that some traders have superior information to
others can create an adequate environment for bubble formation).
24 Some conditions that must be present include short sale constraints and
circumstances wherein the entire supply of the security can be absorbed by a number of
optimistic purchasers.
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prices reflect the preference of the optimists without the
countervailing balance that pessimists would otherwise provide.
B. The Pricing Bubble Trajectory
Bubbles have been said to follow a characteristic timeline.25
Typically, the process starts with some type of trigger or
“displacement” of a magnitude sufficient to affect at least one
sector of the economy. This might be a new innovation, a new
asset class, or other event that creates the apparent opportunity
for profit.26 At first, the new opportunity may operate in the
market like any other commodity. However, unlike more stable
assets, those subject to bubble behavior can experience a rise in
prices or expansion of the opportunity, as an increasing number
of persons become speculators, resellers, or otherwise engaged in
supporting the opportunity.27 The larger and continued
engagement drives demand and prices upwards toward the
unsustainable level.28
Shiller suggests that a “new economy” mindset appears to be
widely prevalent during bubble periods.29 That is, people appear
to be more optimistic, believe that they are part of a “new era”
and that “the future is brighter or less uncertain than it was in
the past.”30 Thus, “speculation is linked with positive economic
expectations, in particular in new and emerging markets and
market segments.”31 According to another source, “[t]he
authorities recognize that something exceptional is happening
and while they are mindful of earlier manias, ‘this time it’s
different’, and they have extensive explanations for the
difference.”32 For the technology stock bubble of the 1990s, there
was a lottery aspect where some buyers believed that their choice
stocks were the winners. This masked the fact that all stocks
were overpriced in the aggregate, because buyers believed in the
possibility (however remote) that their specific stock pick had the
probability of becoming the next high performer. Perhaps for this
reason, in most circumstances, incoherent pricing trends are
notoriously difficult to identify as problematic until after a crash

See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 12, at 27–31.
See id. at 27–29.
Id. at 30–31.
28 Id. at 30.
29 SHILLER, supra note 14, at 31.
30 Id. at 106.
31 Gunther Schnabl & Andreas Hoffmann, Monetary Policy, Vagabonding Liquidity
and Bursting Bubbles in New and Emerging Markets: An Overinvestment View, 31 WORLD
ECON. 1226, 1226–27 (2008).
32 KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 12, at 29.
25
26
27
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occurs. Indeed, warnings issued by governments have not been
effective at stopping bubbles.33
Structural changes can reinforce and facilitate irrational
transactions. The potential for profit attracts increased capital
infusion to facilitate purchases.34 New entities and business
models are created to facilitate transactions and maximize
return.35 Sub-markets for inputs needed to fuel the buying and
selling are created, and discussions about process,
implementation, and strategy become prevalent.36
For those participating in a bubble market, the cycle of
buying and selling sustains prices akin to someone riding a
bicycle because “the rider needs to maintain the forward
momentum or the bike becomes unstable.”37 At any point, a
correction might occur, preventing the formation of a full-blown
bubble.38 However, if the mispricing continues, demand drives
prices above a level that is justifiable based on the asset’s
fundamentals.39 At this juncture, the asset’s pricing is vulnerable
to destabilizing events. Prices at the height of the bubble lack
rationality, and, therefore, information that affects the mood of
optimism can cause investors to exit.
At some point in a typical bubble trajectory, something
signals and the former confidence suddenly turns to pessimism.40
The trigger may seem rather inconsequential and irrelevant
compared to the harm that ultimately occurs when the bubble
bursts.41 It may be a single company’s failure, an exposure of
some incidence of fraud, or other occurrence that sheds some
doubt on the asset’s invulnerability.42 Some have thought that
the bursting of the Internet stock bubble began with the
announcement that the research results of the human genome
project could not be patented.43 This example is remarkable
33 See Yasushi Asako & Kozo Ueda, The Boy Who Cried Bubble: Public Warnings
Against Riding Bubbles, 52 ECON. INQUIRY 1137, 1137–38 (2014) (listing examples).
34 See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 12, at 62.
35 Cf. id. at 45 (“[T]here was a reversal between the objective and the process, and in
the end the objective became the process.”).
36 See id. at 44–46.
37 Id. at 13.
38 See George Soros, Remarks at the Festival of Economics, Trento Italy (June 2,
2012), available at http://www.georgesoros.com/interviews-speeches/entry/remarks_at_the
_festival_of_economics_trento_italy/.
39 Id. (“Eventually the gap between the trend and its biased interpretation grows so
wide that it becomes unsustainable.”).
40 See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 12, at 84–85.
41 Markus K. Brunnermeier & Martin Oehmke, Bubbles, Financial Crises, and
Systemic Risk, in 2B HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1221, 1245 (G.M.
Constantinides et al. eds., 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2103814.
42 See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 12, at 32–33.
43 Brunnermeier & Oehmke, supra note 41, at 1245.
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because investments in communication and biotechnology arise
from entirely different economic sectors. Indeed, this example
demonstrates the fragile nature of bubbles and their irrational
foundations.
As one source describes, as the bubble deflates, “expectations
change slowly at some times and rapidly at others as various
groups realize – sometimes at different moments and at other
times more or less simultaneously – that the current forecasts of
prices and values in the distant future differ from earlier views of
these same prices and values.”44 The prices existent during the
bubble period, lacking the necessary rational connection to
fundamental price drivers, cannot be sustained. Speculation,
funding sources, and optimistic buyers dissipate, sometimes to
the vanishing point. If the price fall is rapid, market prices
destabilize too quickly for appropriate corrections to occur.45
The effect of this destabilization might be confined to
speculators, who must shoulder own their private losses.
However, some crashes introduce feedback into an entire market,
or even beyond. For example, the Internet stock bubble burst so
rapidly that the Dow Jones Internet Index lost over half of its
value in a single month.46 Ultimately, the bursting of the
Internet stock bubble impacted confidence in stocks in general.47
The housing bubble, and the related inflated activity in the
subprime mortgage market, of the first decade of the 2000s led to
a sustained financial crisis and was felt in nearly every sector of
the U.S. economy. Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board Alan Greenspan explained that the crisis was triggered by
bundled and securitized assets comprised of mortgages that were
“supported by unrealistically positive rating designations by
credit agencies,” and later required central banks and
governments “to take unprecedented measures.”48 The ensuing
crash negatively impacted housing, manufacturing, credit,
employment, securities, and consumer confidence levels.49 The
KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 12, at 84.
Soros, supra note 38 (“Bubbles are usually asymmetric in shape: booms develop
slowly but the bust tends to be sudden and devastating. That is due to the use of
leverage: price declines precipitate the forced liquidation of leveraged positions.”).
46 SHILLER, supra note 14, at 128.
47 Id. at 130.
48 The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 12, 15 (2008) (testimony of Alan
Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve Board) [hereinafter Greenspan
Testimony].
49 See generally William Poole, Causes and Consequences of the Financial Crisis of
2007–2009, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 421 (2010); Adam Shell, Lehman Bros. Collapse
Triggered Economic Turmoil, ABCNEWS.COM, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/lehmanbros-collapse-triggered-economic-turmoil/story?id=8543352 (last visited Mar. 12, 2015).
44
45
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crisis is said to have led to the loss of eight million U.S. jobs.50
European markets were affected. Further, the impact may have
precipitated a paradigm shift in the field of economics to
accommodate the study of aggregate volatility.51 These
circumstances have triggered broad questions about the extent
that markets might justifiably rely on the self-interest of
rational, private actors to ensure market stability.52 In the words
of Alan Greenspan, “a critical pillar to market competition and
free markets[] did break down.”53
In the financial sector, governmental intervention or a
lender of last resort can cabin the influence of a bubble’s burst.
Other efforts can limit the impact, such as setting a price floor or
temporarily halting transactions. According to Minsky, the need
for such efforts should not be surprising because, as a capitalist
economy that depends on the pursuit of private profit for
economic growth, there are “inherent and inescapable flaws that
lead to intermittent financial instability.”54 One critical question
is whether there are measures that might be taken to minimize,
or remedy, the instability before it occurs. If there are not, then
the next question is whether its effects can be cabined.
C. Examples of Non-monetary Bubbles
The foregoing discussion of bubble behavior has been applied
to matters other than price. For example, economist Paul
Krugman describes a construction boom as an asset bubble
“driven by rapid growth in an area’s population and employment”
in which the main growth driver is “the local construction boom,
which will eventually collapse when enough houses are
completed.”55 In this circumstance, the growth is fueled by
irrational expectations that cannot be met because they are not
based on true fundamental drivers of housing starts. Rather, the
housing sales are essentially a “natural Ponzi scheme[]” based on
the impossible assumption that the future pricing will
necessarily echo the past.56
Political scientist Moshe Maor describes “policy bubbles,”
which are defined as a non-proportional policy response to an
Poole, supra note 49, at 439.
See Daron Acemoglu, The Crisis of 2008: Structural Lessons for and from
Economics, CENTRE FOR ECON. POL’Y RES., Jan. 2009, at 1, 1–2.
52 Greenspan Testimony, supra note 48, at 45 (“I made a mistake in presuming that
the self-interest of organizations, specifically banks and others, were such is that they
were best capable of protecting their own shareholders and their equity in the firms.”).
53 Id.
54 MINSKY, supra note 3, at 44.
55 Krugman, supra note 11.
56 Id.
50
51

Do Not Delete

656

6/6/2015 11:02 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 18:3

existing problem.57 Specifically, these can occur when under the
existing state of knowledge there is “a real and/or perceived
policy overreaction that is reinforced by positive feedback over a
long period of time,”58 characterized by implementation that
“imposes objective and/or perceived social costs without
producing offsetting objective and/or perceived benefits.”59 Some
examples cited by those in the field include privatization for
infrastructure,
government
tsars,
and
perhaps
even
sustainability.60 As Maor explains, people have a tendency to
“‘fall in love’ with . . . subjectively very attractive ideas or people
that individuals imagine can satisfy their deepest desires that
they may only be slightly aware of or not at all.”61 The burst of a
policy bubble can “wreak havoc on the policy system” in a
number of ways.62
Despite their costs, some policy bubbles create positive
public benefits that are difficult to quantify.63 For example, the
Human Genome Project and the Apollo space program were
accomplished when “the large risks that have been undertaken
individually, politically and financially, leading to a collective
(individual, public and political) over-enthusiasm” which drove
them to their completion.64 Under this view, the overall
dimension and risks of these projects, which can have important
societal payoffs, are “an essential element in the dynamics of
important inventions or innovations, and are thus crucial for
society.”65
Such bubbles bear some relation to those based on price
skews. The behavior of buyers (or supporters, in the case of policy
bubbles) leans toward support of the activity in question. This
support, because it lacks a connection with the fundamental
value of the activity, is outsized, irrational, and, in the long term,
unsustainable.
Unless
a
societal
benefit—perhaps
unquantifiable—is achieved, these non-monetary bubbles can
have a detrimental impact.
57 See Moshe Maor, Policy Bubbles: Policy Overreaction and Positive Feedback,
27 GOVERNANCE: INT’L J. POL’Y ADMIN. & INSTITUTIONS 469 (2014).
58 Id. at 470 (emphasis omitted).
59 Id.
60 Id. at 470–71, 475 (quoting Robert Henry Cox & Daniel Béland, Valence, Policy
Ideas, and the Rise of Sustainability, 26 GOVERNANCE 307 (2013)).
61 Id. at 475.
62 Id. at 476 (acknowledging the need for additional modeling).
63 See, e.g., Monika Gisler, Didier Sornette & Ryan Woodard, Innovation As a Social
Bubble: The Example of the Human Genome Project, 40 RES. POL’Y 1412 (2011); Monika
Gisler & Didier Sornette, Bubbles Everywhere in Human Affairs, SWISS FIN. INST. 1 (RES.
PAPER SERIES) 10–16 (2010).
64 Gisler & Sornette, Bubbles Everywhere in Human Affairs, supra note 63, at 16.
65 Id. at 18.
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D. Bitcoin’s Bubble Characteristics
This foregoing discussion outlines the general principles of
bubbles in both price and non-price contexts. This Article will
now turn to a discussion of Bitcoin, which media sources have
already named a bubble.66 As one example, The Economist opined
that recent Bitcoin price activity “looks like a classic bubble.
Hoarding means that Bitcoin is currently more of a speculative
asset than a currency.”67 Economists Alan Greenspan, Robert
Shiller, and John Quiggen have suggested the same.68 According
to Quiggen, the lack of the asset’s intrinsic worth suggests that
holders must depend on appreciation, rather than intrinsic value
or future income flow.69 For an asset that lacks any intrinsic
value, any value above the zero mark is not justifiable in the long
run.70
Consistent with this explanation, Greenspan has explained
that Bitcoin’s inability to prove its intrinsic value, is fatal, as
“[y]ou have to really stretch your imagination to infer what the
intrinsic value of Bitcoin is. I haven’t been able to do it. Maybe
somebody else can.”71 Both Norway and Finland have been
reported to categorize Bitcoin as a commodity, rather than a
currency.72 According to the head of oversight at the Bank of
Finland, Bitcoin cannot be considered as a currency because
there is no issuer that is responsible, and that its “changes in
value are totally unregulated and very vulnerable to news,
speculation and hoaxes.”73 If it is true that Bitcoin’s value is
significantly higher than warranted by its underlying
fundamentals, the asset is exhibiting classic bubble
characteristics.
66 See The Bitcoin Bubble, ECONOMIST, Nov. 30, 2013, at 13, available at
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21590901-it-looks-overvalued-even-if-digital-curr
ency-crashes-others-will-follow-bitcoin; Tim Worstall, Yes, of Course Bitcoin Is Showing
Bubble Behaviour, FORBES (Nov. 19, 2013, 1:48 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tim
worstall/2013/11/19/yes-of-course-bitcoin-is-showing-bubble-behaviour/.
67 The Bitcoin Bubble, supra note 66.
68 See Robert J. Shiller, In Search of a Stable Electronic Currency, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
1, 2014, at BU4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/02/business/in-search-of-astable-electronic-currency.html; John Quiggin, The Bitcoin Bubble and a Bad Hypothesis,
NAT’L INT., Apr. 16, 2013, at 3, available at http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/thebitcoin-bubble-bad-hypothesis-8353; Jeff Kearns, Greenspan Says Bitcoin a Bubble
Without Intrinsic Currency Value, BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 4, 2013, 2:37 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-04/greenspan-says-bitcoin-a-bubble-without-intr
insic-currency-value.html.
69 Quiggin, supra note 68 (“Bitcoin is perhaps the finest example of a pure bubble.”).
70 Id.
71 Kearns, supra note 68.
72 Kati Pohjanpalo, Bitcoin Judged Commodity in Finland After Failing Money Test,
BLOOMBERG.COM (Jan. 20, 2014, 4:50 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201401-19/bitcoin-becomes-commodity-in-finland-after-failing-currency-test.
73 Id.
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As background, Bitcoin is a privately issued currency based
on a decentralized network.74 Unlike government-issued
currencies, distribution derives from multiple exchange
platforms. This virtual currency is not backed by any country or
economic system. Bitcoin.org asserts that prices are dictated by
the standard economic principle of supply and demand.75 To
ensure that the system does not flood the market with Bitcoins,
rendering the entire sector valueless, scarcity is built into the
system through temporal limits on the rate at which new
Bitcoins can be created, as well as an aggregate cap of
twenty-one million in total.76 It has been observed: “both sellers
and buyers are building their opinion about a fair price without a
quantifiable economic anchor or model.”77
Conventional comparators used by government-issued
currencies, such as measures against standard currencies, do not
exist for this virtual currency.78 There are few robust competitors
to provide parity valuation. On the demand side, the currency
creates incentives to hoard, which can artificially inflate
demand.79 One currency expert has reported that Bitcoin price
increases are trending above its entire future maximum market
capitalization.80
Further, one study has shown a correlation between Bitcoin
price shifts and an increase in media reports about the
currency.81 This circumstance suggests that prices are being set
based on subjective perception, and not traditional drivers that
include supply and demand. This same source found that those
74 See generally Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System,
BITCOIN.ORG, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
75 FAQ - Bitcoin, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq (last visited Feb. 17, 2015) (“The
price of a bitcoin is determined by supply and demand.”).
76 JERRY BRITO & ANDREA CASTILLO, MERCATUS CTR., BITCOIN: A PRIMER FOR
POLICY MAKERS 6–7 (2013), available at http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Brito_Bit
coinPrimer.pdf.
77 Florian Glaser et al., How to Price a Digital Currency? Empirical Insights on the
Influence of Media Coverage on the Bitcoin Bubble, in TAGUNGSBAND MULTIKONFERENZ
WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK 2014 (MKWI 2014) 1404, 1408 (2014).
78 Id. at 1409.
79 See generally Ronald Stiff, Keith Johnson & Khairy Ahmed Tourk, Scarcity and
Hoarding: Economic and Social Explanations and Marketing Implications, in 2
ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RESEARCH 203 (1975); Paul Krugman, Golden Cyberfetters, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 7, 2011, 12:20 AM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/07/goldencyberfetters/ (“[T]here has been an incentive to hoard the virtual currency rather than
spending it.”).
80 DAVID WOO, IAN GORDON & VADIM IARALOV, BANK OF AM. MERRILL LYNCH,
BITCOIN: A FIRST ASSESSMENT (2013), available at https://ciphrex.com/archive/bofa-bit
coin.pdf; see also Krugman, supra note 79.
81 Glaser et al., supra note 77, at 1415. Another paper suggests that other demand
drivers include the novelty of the system and the currency’s global availability. FLORIAN
GLASER ET AL., BITCOIN – ASSET OR CURRENCY? REVEALING USERS’ HIDDEN INTENTIONS 5
(2012), available at http://ecis2014.eu/E-poster/files/0917-file1.pdf.
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who hold Bitcoin appear to have an optimistic bias and hold the
asset in anticipation of price appreciation.82 Seeking to buy low
and sell high, those holding the currency appear to be
anticipating arbitrage for profit to subsequent purchasers.
Further, according to the European Central Bank, “it can
justifiably be stated that Bitcoin is a high-risk system” that
“could collapse if people try to get out of the system and are not
able to do so because of its illiquidity.”83
It is well known that Bitcoin pricing is subject to high
volatility.84 Further, there do not appear to be external market
correctors or agencies of last resort. Bitcoin does not promise to
take action to prevent rapid devaluation or to operate as an
institution of last resort to ensure returns to those who hold
currency.85 Although it is too early to definitively determine
whether Bitcoin is subject to bubble pricing in fact, some
indicators suggest that Bitcoin pricing is not well correlated to
standard economic principles of supply and demand.86
II. THE PATENT AS ASSET: THE NEW ECONOMY OF IP
A. Patent Valuation and the Monetization Industry
This Article will turn to examining patent monetization
activity in light of the foregoing discussion. In doing so, a
distinction is drawn between the fundamental, statutorily
defined definition of patent prices and those obtained through
patent arbitrage. Although patent assertion programs had been
undertaken in the past in a limited manner, the increases in

82 See GLASER ET AL., BITCOIN – ASSET OR CURRENCY? REVEALING USERS’ HIDDEN
INTENTIONS, supra note 81, at 11.
83 EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES 27 (2012), available at
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf.
84 See e.g., Greg Bensinger, Will Bitcoin Be Accepted by Paypal?, WALL ST. J. BLOGS
(Apr. 30, 2013, 4:24 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/04/30/could-paypal-be-on-hori
zon-for-bitcoin/; BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 76, at 17–18; see also BITCOIN CHARTS,
http://bitcoincharts.com/charts/bitstampUSD#tgSzm1g10zm2g25zv (last visited Sept. 18,
2014).
85 As Gavin Andresen, a chief scientist at Bitcoin, cautioned, “Bitcoin is an
experiment. Treat it like you would a promising Internet start-up company: maybe it will
change the world, but realize that investing your money or time in new ideas is always
risky.” Gavin Andresen, That Which Does Not Kill Us Makes Us Stronger, GAVINTHINK
(June 20, 2011, 11:56 AM), http://gavinthink.blogspot.com/2011/06/that-which-does-notkill-us-makes-us.html. But see FAQ - Bitcoin: Won’t Bitcoin Fall in a Deflationary Spiral?,
BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq#what-determines-bitcoins-price (last visited Sept. 18,
2014) (“With a stable monetary base and a stable economy, the value of the currency
should remain the same.”).
86 See The Bitcoin Bubble, supra note 66; Worstall, supra note 66.
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sophistication, complexity, and volume are comparatively
recent.87
This separation parallels the analyses of other assets, which
consider pricing of the asset as an investment as a distinct
operation from more traditional functions. Thus, an appropriate
economic analysis of Bitcoin as an investment is distinct from the
currency’s fundamental drivers as a currency.88 Similarly, this
same division is drawn between a home that is priced as a home,
compared to the home priced as an investment for resale.
Applying this same distinction, patents priced as legal rights
under the statutory definition and patents used for monetization
are viewed separately.
Unlike the traditional uses of legal rights to vindicate a legal
harm, patent assertion entities consider court dates as liquidity
events and patents as assets to be arbitraged.89 In this context,
patent values are largely determined either privately or through
litigation awards. Across all sectors, the methodology for setting
patent values is indeterminate. As one recent survey of in-house
patent attorneys concluded, “[v]irtually all interviewees
lamented the fact that no coherent valuation technique exists.”90
Negotiations between patent monetizers and accused infringers
lack mutual understandings of a patent’s worth.91 One recent
survey of patent monetizers concludes that this group believes
that valuation is one of their largest concerns.92 According to one
interviewee, the problem of imprecision in patent valuation
87 SUZANNE S. HARRISON & PATRICK H. SULLIVAN, EDISON IN THE BOARDROOM
REVISITED 217 (2012) (noting that patent assertion has existed for years but “[w]hat has
changed recently is the size and scale of the activities”); David L. Schwartz, The Rise of
Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 380–81 (2012);
see also Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1,
1; Alvarado, supra note 2, at 58 (observing that patent monetization began rising around
2003).
88 See generally Krugman, supra note 79.
89 See generally Andrei Hagiu & David Yoffie, Intermediaries for the IP Market
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 12-023, 2011).
90 Malcolm T. Meeks & Charles A. Eldering, Patent Valuation: Aren’t We Forgetting
Something? Making the Case for Claims Analysis in Patent Valuation by Proposing a
Patent Valuation Method and a Patent-Specific Discount Rate Using the CAPM, 9 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 194, 205 (2010); see also Alvarado, supra note 2, at 57 (“[T]he
tricky part is that the line between what makes each party happy is not clear at all.”).
91 Alvarado, supra note 2, at 57 (“From the NPE [non-practicing entities] side, there
might be too high expectations on the amount asked for the license; and on the side of the
operating company, there might be unwillingness to pay the rates that the licensing
company is proposing.”).
92 Id. at 66; see also Tomoya Yanagisawa & Dominique Guellec, The Emerging
Patent Marketplace 14 (OECD Sci., Tech. & Indus., Working Paper No. 2009/09, 2009),
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/218413152254 (“[M]ost [patent monetizers] have
difficulty in identifying the value of their patents, since the value of a patent is based on a
number of factors including the breadth of the claims, how widely the patent is already
being used or will be used in the future, and the ability to enforce the patent.”).
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“is the mother of them all.”93 Another queried, “[W]hat is the real
value of a patent? No one knows and the models that have we
have right now are not mature enough.”94 The circumstance is
further complicated by the fact that patent valuations change
from one infringer to another, depending on the nature of the
use.95
These quotes are based on the present state of the law,
where few solid price benchmarks exist and none are likely to
emerge.96 There are remarkably few market correctors to
stabilize and guide patent values. One potentially stabilizing
source of price comparators is jury verdicts, which determine the
value of the use of a patented technology according to a
fifteen-factor test that “overloads the jury with factors to consider
that may be irrelevant, overlapping, or even contradictory.”97
Verdicts based on the fifteen-factor test, which by their nature
vary from case to case, are subject to a deferential standard of
review.98 These standards, such as they are, tolerate a wide
range of disagreement about valuation. Industry norms may
provide some comparators, although patent assertion entities do
not disclose specifics, license agreements are largely confidential,
and there are few comparators.99
As previously described, Miller suggests that the existence of
differences of opinion about an asset’s value is sufficient to skew
pricing.100 This circumstance is prevalent in patent licensing,
where price anchors are limited. To the extent that there is price
competition, it manifests in the form of patent assertion entities
bidding against each other to obtain the highest-value patents
from sellers, driving portfolio prices upward to the highest
bidder.101 Those with pessimistic expectations about this activity

Alvarado, supra note 2, at 66.
Id.
Cf. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL
5593609, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (“[A] court should consider the importance of the
patent . . . to the alleged infringer’s accused products.”).
96 See Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating
Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627 (2010) (outlining the uncertainties
created by current reasonable royalty calculations and proposing a solution).
97 Id. at 628. A patentee can also obtain lost profits from an infringer. As a practical
matter, because patent monetization entities do not make products, this form of relief is
unavailable in this context.
98 Id. (stating that jury royalty findings made on this complex, multi-factor test are
“almost entirely immune from scrutiny by either district or appellate judges facing a
deferential standard of review”).
99 It appears that some entities go to great lengths to shield the confidentiality of the
terms of these agreements. See Anderson, supra note 1.
100 See Miller, supra note 23.
101 Cf. RPX Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 8 (Mar. 26, 2012) (stating that parties
within this field, including patent assertion entities, compete for high value patents).
93
94
95
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would only rarely engage in such competitions to moderate
pricing discussions.102
The federal judiciary has manifested deep divisions as to the
appropriate starting point. For example, Judge Posner’s opinion
in Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. accepted, in principle, that a
patent lawsuit might yield nominal damages where the
infringement results in no actual harm to the rights holder.103 In
essence, Posner’s conclusion rests on the fact that a patentee’s
failure to demonstrate harm warrants no monetary relief, based
on nature of the patent right, the Supreme Court’s eBay opinion,
and the limited power of the federal courts.104 An extension of
Posner’s viewpoint leads to the inference that licensors who are
unable to demonstrate more than a mere trespass of their patent
right are not entitled to any revenue from accused infringers.
Certainly, this has the profound potential to throw a stake into
the heart of patent monetization practices. The concept of legal
harm, like so many legal conclusions, rests on policy choices
imposed by law. In this sense, monetizers would be required to
show a legally cognizable harm recognized as such by existing
legal standards. Specifically, patent monetizers are in the
business of selling (or licensing) their own injury. If patent
infringement that is a mere trespass is judicially limited to
nominal damages, the monetizer’s injury has virtually no
financial worth. Accused infringers already have “a negative
preconception of what [patent monetizers] do,” and no rational
operating company would pay a license fee without the force of
law behind it.105
On appeal, the Federal Circuit questioned Posner’s
conclusion in Apple v. Motorola, and stated that every
infringement warrants some measure of damages except in the
very narrowest (and unlikely) circumstances.106 In effect, the
Federal Circuit’s analysis creates a floor for virtually any valid

102 An accused infringer may seek to purchase a patent for the lowest possible price.
However, a bidding war between a monetizer and an accused infringer would prevent
such a transaction from being consummated at a low price. Under these circumstances,
an accused infringer has the incentive to bid high to avoid the risk of an adverse judgment
and transaction costs if the patent is litigated against it.
103 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 909–10 (N.D. Ill. 2012), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part and remanded, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
104 See id.
105 Alvarado, supra note 2, at 57.
106 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (stating that a
patentee may obtain nominal damages award only where “the defendant considered the
patent valueless and the patentee would have accepted no payment for the defendant’s
infringement,” and acknowledging that “it seems unlikely that a willing licensor and
willing licensee would agree to a zero royalty payment in a hypothetical negotiation,
where both infringement and validity are assumed”).
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and infringed patents. By extension, this appellate ruling might
be read to support the patent monetizer’s business model. This
disparate view of damages reveals a philosophical difference
among the jurists about patent values. More broadly, these
jurists fundamentally disagree over whether a mere trespass of
the patent right is sufficient to support a damages award. These
opinions reflect fundamental differences between these jurists
about the nature of infringement, the Supreme Court’s eBay
opinion, and the power of the federal courts. Significantly, this
further demonstrates that any nascent patent market rests on a
system that might shift theoretically at its most fundamental
levels.
B. Capturing Value in a Knowledge Economy
At present, rights holders privately manage their intellectual
property to maximize their competitive advantage and,
ultimately, revenue. There is no governmental requirement,
incentive, or suggestion that such practices occur in a manner
that is consistent with the public interest. Patent monetization
might be subject to the types of frictions, identified by Minsky,
that are suitable to create incoherence. As one example—similar
to the thinking that was prevalent during the tech stock bubble
of the 1990s—each rights holder may strongly believe that its
own patent portfolio warrants maximum damages. This
circumstance has the potential to drive patent prices upward.
Coupled with the high costs of defense, this activity can lead to
an end-point wherein the total demand for license fees outstrips
accused infringers’ willingness or ability to pay.
The practice of patent monetization has been analogized to
the creation of a new asset class—that is, “a new alchemy of
corporate wealth creation in which intellectual property has come
to play a powerful new role as a strategic asset and competitive
weapon of enormous value.”107 This viewpoint is typified, among
other places, by the book Rembrandts in the Attic: Unlocking the
Hidden Value of Patents (“Rembrandts”), published in 2000,
which instructed readers on patent monetization strategies.108
107 KEVIN G. RIVETTE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATTIC: UNLOCKING THE
HIDDEN VALUE OF PATENTS 43 (2000).
108 Id. at 28; see also HARRISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 87, at 96 (discussing
capturing IP value through monetization strategies). This verbiage is not confined to
books. For example, Acacia Research Corporation states on its website that its mission is
to “set[] patents free.” See Patent Licensing Primer, ACACIA RES. CORP.,
http://acaciaresearch.com/how-we-work/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2015). Acacia Research
“work[s] towards . . . providing inventors and organizations with opportunities to unleash
the untapped potential in patents.” How We Work, ACACIA RES. CORP.,
http://acaciaresearch.com/how-we-work/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2015).
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The book quotes former Securities and Exchange commissioner
Steven Wallman, who explained: “I see this [trend] coming out of
a change in our economy from one that is industrial-based to one
that is knowledge-based, where intellectual property, soft assets,
and other intangibles increasingly make up the bulk of the asset
base for wealth production in our society.”109 Although Wallman’s
quotation might be read to encourage companies to increase
research and development, Rembrandts urged CEOs to take
advantage of the “current run-up in intellectual asset values” by
asserting their patents to generate licensing revenue by
developing strategies that “liberate the untapped value of their
company’s intellectual assets” and “achieve outsized gains.”110
Citing several high-profile success stories, the authors described
non-practicing entity executives who “like to refer to themselves
as ‘merchant scientists’ who roam the world ‘prowling for great
ideas to license to deep-pocketed manufacturers.’”111 The work
describes numerous methods for leveraging “the huge IP asset
values lying untapped in intellectual property portfolios,” and
noting that “the value of intellectual property [is] rising by leaps
and bounds.”112 Such quotes appear to parallel the “new economy
thinking” identified by Shiller as to bubble creation. In short,
patent monetization has been viewed as a key opportunity for
positive financial growth.113
A web of new business structures has emerged to support
patent assertion activity. These include intermediaries that rely
on multiple subsidiaries and funds, as well as entities that
finance acquisition and enforcement litigation.114 Some assist
inventors and owners to fine-tune or expand their original
rights.115 Some assist product companies to defend against
allegations of patent infringement.116 Educated and expert
participants populate these new structures. Together, these
circumstances paint a picture that there is a monetary
opportunity relating to the patent monetization field.

109 RIVETTE & KLINE, supra note 107, at 51 (quoting Steven Wallman, former
Securities and Exchange Commission Commissioner).
110 Id. at 124.
111 Id. at 132.
112 Id. at 144.
113 See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 12, at 27–29.
114 See id. at 30–33.
115 Acacia Research Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 7–8 (Feb. 25, 2014) (“[W]e
often assist patent holders with the acquisition of additional rights associated with their
inventions both in the United States and across the globe.”).
116 For an overview of various business structures in the patent monetization space,
see generally RAYMOND MILLIEN & RON LAURIE, A SUMMARY OF ESTABLISHED AND
EMERGING IP BUSINESS MODELS 5–6 (2007), available at http://www.concap.cc/wpcontent/uploads/2012/03/IP-Business-Models.pdf.
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Patent arbitrage has reached a large scale that is part of a
large and complex industry; as one source observes, “the scale
itself is simply mind-boggling.”117 The amount of capital raised by
patent assertion entities to operationalize their business plans is
estimated to be in the billions of dollars.118 Approximations of the
number of active patent assertion entities vary widely, from 250
to over 1000.119 By May 2009, the largest had spent over
$1 billion acquiring patents.120 Another monetizer, Acacia
Technologies, owns rights to over 200 patent portfolios, either
directly or through its subsidiaries.121 Although few entities
disclose numerical details of their operations, it is thought that
most obtain the majority of their licensing revenue through
negotiation, rather than litigation.122 The sheer volume of patent
transactions are notable, and suggest that this activity is
sufficient to impact patent valuations more broadly.
High volume patent transfers are reported to rival (or
exceed) the prices of skyscrapers. One source reports that
Microsoft obtained a broad license to Acacia Technology’s patents
for a three-year term for $22.5 million dollars.123 Kodak
monetized its 1100-patent portfolio to a group of operating
companies for $525 million.124 In 2012, Acacia spent $150 million
to acquire a patent portfolio covering 4G wireless technologies.125
Also that year, another monetizer named Vringo paid Nokia
$22 million and an ongoing revenue stream for patents essential
for cell phone data transmission.126
Today, there is currently a greater quantity of patents
available for purchase.127 Managers seeking ready cash or a
revenue stream have marketed patents that have been deemed

Ewing & Feldman, supra note 87, at 2; see also RPX Corp., supra note 101, at 2.
RPX Corp., supra note 101, at 4; see also Schwartz, supra note 87, at 339 (“While
historically there has been a small amount of buying and selling of freestanding patents,
there is substantial evidence that the market for patents has recently grown.”).
119 Letter from Noreen Krall, Vice President, Chief Legal Counsel, Apple Corp., to
Donald S. Clark, Sec’y FTC (Dec. 16, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/public_comments/2013/12/00069-87879.pdf; RPX Corp., supra note 101,
at 4.
120 Nigel Page, IV Shifts Gear, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. MAG., July–Aug. 2009, at 9, 13.
121 Acacia Research Corp., supra note 115, at 3.
122 Cf. Joff Wild, Star Man, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. MAG., July–Aug. 2013, at 63, 67
(describing a patent assertion entity’s preference to negotiate, rather than litigate).
123 Video Streaming Solutions L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 13 C 7031, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 71739, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 27, 2014).
124 Andrew Martin, Kodak to Sell Digital Imaging Patents for $525 Million, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2012, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/business/
kodak-to-sell-patents-for-525-million.html.
125 Acacia Research Corp., supra note 115, at 30.
126 Vringo Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 6 (Mar. 21, 2013).
127 Schwartz, supra note 87, at 379.
117
118
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unnecessary to protect their companies’ competitive position.128
There is some evidence that shows that research universities
have transferred either patents or the rights to future research to
monetizer Intellectual Ventures.129
Unlike stocks that are purchased and re-sold to “keep the
bicycle moving forward to maintain momentum,” the ability to
recoup the sales price and profit occurs largely through licensing
or litigating a patent (or a portfolio of related patents). The
successful innovators are the most frequent and high profile
targets of this activity.130 In some instances, this may be
accomplished by finding so-called “undervalued” patents. Yet
inputs into this market include sophisticated entities.131
Although it is certainly plausible that some patents sold by these
experienced entities are undervalued, it is not entirely clear that
this can occur across the board. Furthermore, the lack of
valuation benchmarks contributes to patent assertion entities’
ability to “buy low, license high” even from well-informed,
sophisticated patent sellers.
Some firms have turned a significant profit. For example,
Acacia Technologies has asserted that it has earned a tripled rate
of return over a five-year period, and of that it has returned over
$600 million to its investors.132 During 2013, three publicly
traded patent monetizers achieved a rate of return better than
the S&P 500 average.133 Nonetheless, the year-to-year
performance of these entities has not been steady.134 In part, this
is because any individual companies’ performance is strongly
aligned with its litigation calendar.135

Id. at 380.
Ewing & Feldman, supra note 87, at 7–8.
Most Pursued Companies, PAT. FREEDOM (July 14, 2014), https://www.patent
freedom.com/about-npes/pursued/.
131 In some reported instances, patent aggregators have re-sold patents to other
non-practicing entities, which mimics the “keep the bicycle moving forward to maintain
momentum,” conduct indicative of pricing bubbles. However, it is not clear whether the
sale prices are higher than the purchase price of these assets, or how widespread this
practice is.
132 See ACACIA RESEARCH CORP., INVESTOR RELATIONS PRESENTATION, Q2 2014, at 8
(2014), available at http://acaciaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Acacia-Resea
rch-Presentation-Q214.pdf; ACACIA RESEARCH CORP., INVESTMENT PROFILE JUNE 2014, at
1 (2014), available at http://acaciaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Acacia-FactSheet-Q2-2014.pdf.
133 Maulin Shah, Stock Performance of Publicly Traded Patent Trolls – A Year in
Review, PATENTVUE (May 2, 2014, 5:03 PM), http://envisionip.com/blog/2014/05/02/stockperformance-publicly-traded-patent-trolls-year-review/.
134 Id.
135 See id.
128
129
130
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C. Patent Assertion Pricing Methods and Fundamentals
The key questions center on whether overall prices within
this imperfect market bear a reasonable relationship to
fundamental drivers of patent valuation. To the extent there is a
significant disconnect, additional issues begin to emerge. These
include the question of whether a dramatic shift in the patent
monetization area will affect confidence in the patent system
more generally. Additionally, to the extent that current licensing
valuations are skewed, there is a question of whether subsequent
valuations will continue to rely on such transaction prices as
comparators in the future. To the extent that this occurs without
correction, any currently elevated prices can be expected to
distort any patent market that later develops.
Anticipated returns on monetization investments are based
on the ability to recoup the sale price, plus obtain a profit, from
licensing—in other words, the practice of “buy low, license high.”
Rational patent monetizers purchase patents at a level that
anticipates profit to be made through the churning, turnover
event.136 Yet on its face, this practice violates the one-price rule.
A patent’s intrinsic characteristics do not change through
transfer to a patent assertion entity. Objectively, the patent
claims no more than it did before, and it is no more likely to be
infringed or valid. The market and its technological context have
not changed by the mere fact of transfer. Although some
unsophisticated or distressed sellers may be pricing patents
below market value, there are some inherent difficulties with
this explanation. It assumes an accepted foundation for
calculating royalties that is currently lacking. Additionally, seller
companies and universities presumably possess access to
sufficient resources to properly value patents to the extent that
this is feasible. Even some distressed sellers, including Kodak
and Nortel, have sold patents to high-profile patent buyers even
though both companies were in difficult financial circumstances
at the time of sale.137 One source suggests that patent
aggregators compete to buy; patents are sold to the highest

136 Cf. Wild, supra note 122, at 66–67 (describing the goal of the enterprise to
maximize return on the patents). Notably, each transaction must factor in the cost of
assertion, including the cost of negotiation or litigation. Dan Levine & Tom Hals,
Exclusive: Intellectual Ventures Faces Novel Attack on Patent Business, REUTERS, (Oct. 29,
2013, 7:10 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/29/us-intellectual-ventures-law
suit-idUSBRE99S05120131029 (describing that a patent acquired for $750,000 by
Intellectual Ventures warranted damages of $310 million against two infringers).
137 Martin, supra note 124, at B3; Peg Brickley, Nortel $4.5-Billion Patent Sale to
Apple, Microsoft, Others Approved, WALL ST. J., (July 11, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052702303812104576440161959082234.

Do Not Delete

668

6/6/2015 11:02 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 18:3

bidder.138 It cannot be said that all patent monetizer profits are
attributable to purchasing undervalued patents.
It has been asserted that patent monetizers add value by
adding expertise to transaction and litigation activity. Yet such
activity does not necessarily pull “under-valued” patents to a
price that reflects fundamental value. Critically, it has been
reported that licenses are signed at prices necessary to avoid
litigation costs instead of the patent’s true value.139 As one source
describes, patent monetization entities appear to “capitalize on
the poorly functioning patent market” rather than to create a
well-functioning, efficient one.140
According to Apple, perhaps the most frequent target of
patent monetizers, larger companies are asked to pay for patent
licenses to avoid the cost of defense.141 According to the company,
“the opening line of many negotiations is some form of, ‘What
we’re asking for is less than it will cost you to litigate this case to
judgment.’”142 It has agreed to over fifty settlements, and “the
threat of fees often forces an undeserved settlement” to avoid the
high cost of defense.143 Compared with small startups, larger
companies face big ticket demands, and monetizers “have a
reputation for surprising the largest and most profitable
companies with infringement lawsuits just after the
announcement of a new and important product.”144
Based on its experiences, Apple states: “The gap between
a [patent assertion entity’s patent] acquisition price and its
ultimate demand suggests that something other than the
patent’s contribution to innovation and progress is

138 RPX CORP., supra note 101, at 8 (stating that parties within this field, including
patent assertion entities, compete for high-value patents).
139 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 6
(June 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_re
port.pdf (“Given [the high cost to defend against patent claims], many patent owners and
users prefer to settle out of court for amounts that have not so much to do with the
economic value of their patents or the probability that they have infringed. Instead,
settlements are affected more by the parties’ relative opportunity costs of going to trial
and attitudes towards risk . . . .”); Robin Feldman, Patent Demands & Startup
Companies: The View from the Venture Capital Community, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 236,
275 (2014) (noting that an offer to settle was based on the observation that a license was
signed for $1–2 million, in order to avoid $3–5 million in attorney fees to litigate the
dispute).
140 RPX and the Broken Patent Market, PUNCH CARD INVESTING (Oct. 11, 2013),
http://punchcardblog.wordpress.com/2013/10/11/rpx-and-the-broken-patent-market/.
141 Brief of Apple Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 2, Octane
Fitness, L.L.C. v. Icon Health and Fitness, Inc., No. 12-1184 (2014).
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Letter from Noreen Krall, supra note 119.
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driving . . . patent valuation.”145 If Posner is correct that
harmless patent infringement warrants nominal damages, then
the logical baseline for some discussions is close to the nominal
mark, and not the far higher amount attributable to litigation
defense costs.146
The reasons that nuisance settlements work in the short
term is that any single valid claim that is arguably sufficient to
encompass a single feature of an innovator’s product creates a
viable foundation for a lawsuit, together with all of the attendant
costs and disruptions. The more sophisticated monetizers take a
portfolio approach to patent acquisition.147 As one source points
out, “a well-conceived patent portfolio operates much like a
‘super-patent’; its scale-effects mean that a holder wields
otherwise-unattainable market power in a particular
technological field.”148 From the perspective of those accused of
infringement, these portfolios create a cloud of uncertainty that
is difficult to permeate. A monetizer that owns thousands of
patent claims creates an intimidation factor that cannot be
paralleled by the assertion of a single patent. Weaknesses in one
patent can be easily overcome with arguments based on any of a
dozen or so other patents in the portfolio. Under these
circumstances, “the range of each patent cannot be determined
without a large investment of time and effort, and any
pre-litigation predictions about the scope of a patent may prove
incredibly wrong.”149
One study reports that small entities are also targets of
those who are responsible for nuisance demands—that is,
demands for license payments that are less than the cost of
defending against the case.150 Because the cost of patent
litigation can easily reach hundreds of thousands of dollars up to
millions, patent monetizers can charge a significant fee despite
the high likelihood that the asserted patent is invalid or
worthless.151 In one reported instance, patent monetizer Lodsys

Id.
Generally, the Patent Act requires that royalties be based on the use of the
invention and track the value of the patent’s contribution over the prior art. 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 (2012); see also Amy L. Landers, Patent Claim Apportionment, Patentee Injury, and
Sequential Invention, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 471, 490 (2012).
147 Cf. Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 6 (2005) (noting that firms will take a portfolio approach to patents).
148 Id. at 7.
149 Ewing & Feldman, supra note 87, at 25.
150 Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461, 477
(2014).
151 Why Patent Quality Matters, PAT. QUALITY INITIATIVE, http://www.patentquality
initiative.com/about%20pqi/why%20patent%20quality%20matters (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
145
146
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offered small app developers a royalty rate of 0.575% of revenue that
became due only once the app developer reached a quarterly revenue
of $10,000. Such settlements in effect would require no money upfront
from a small developer, but allow Lodsys to advertise that their patent
was licensed at a certain rate.152

These agreements, which are attractive to cash-starved
startups because they avoid any requirement for an early lump
sum payment, enable the patentee to institute an artificially high
royalty rate.153 Once a critical mass of licensees has been signed,
the inflated rate can be used as that patent’s established royalty
rate against larger companies in both licensing negotiations and
in court. Any patents of no or low value that have had rates
artificially inflated from their fundamental value represent price
skews from their fundamental value.
Licensing rates that are based on an amount necessary to
defend against infringement allegations lack a rational
connection to the fundamental drivers of patent value—that is,
the value of the patented technology. For patent assertion that
relies on nuisance settlements, patent pricing is likely to exhibit
volatility based on factors relating to the rising (or lowering) of
the cost of defense.154 For these, the strategic uses of patents
have shifted the focus of the pricing metric to the patent’s
strategic value, rather than the fundamental value of the claims.
Additionally, a patent that can be asserted against several
deep-pocket infringers garners higher prices than those that can
be asserted against those with fewer financial resources,
regardless of the fundamental value of the underlying
technology. In an environment with few objective anchors, these
circumstances suggest that a bubble-like pattern of price
optimism in obtaining patents, followed by a pattern of profit
recovery through assertion, may push patent values from their
fundamental values.
Additional research indicates that the monetizer’s ability to
buy low and license depends on strategies to maximize monetary
return.155 Monetization most profitably occurs when the accused

Chien, supra note 150, at 478.
Id. at 477–78 (describing the strategy).
See Richard Lloyd, Alice Decision a Big Reason for Sharp Fall in US Patent
Litigation, Says Mark Lemley, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.iammagazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=dadf4dce-0f75-45dc-9339-dacb0f7bb465 (observing that
“the value that the patentees can get from the litigation goes down” when fee shifting and
the probability of a dismissal of a patent case on the pleadings increase).
155 For an example, see Axel Haus & Steffen Juranek, Patent Trolls, Litigation, and
the Market for Innovation 13 (May 15, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2424407. For a criticism of findings
that relate to such targeting, see Ted Sichelman, Are Patent Trolls “Opportunistic”? (San
152
153
154
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infringer has already invested in the commercialization,
marketing, service, and support for the accused product. As
stated by Edith Ramirez, “[p]articularly in the high-tech sector,
where patent notice is notoriously difficult, licensing fees are
likely to reflect investments the implementer has made to bring a
product to market, rather than the true economic value of the
patent.”156 Higher settlements can be obtained from innovators
who would otherwise encounter significant cost and disruption to
redesign the product. Coupled with these practices is the problem
that it occurs in an environment with only interstitial value
comparators based on a patent’s true fundamentals.
It has been reported that monetizers target firms with strong
cash positions, particularly those with recent cash level
increases, including revenue sources that are unrelated to any
use of the technology.157 Additionally, patent assertion is more
likely to hit “firms that are busy dealing with a number of other
litigation events unrelated to intellectual property.”158 Further, it
has been reported that non-practicing entities hold their patents
until assertion will maximize business disruption, rather than
seeking to license companies who are in the market for a
technologically creative design solution.159 Although these
strategies may fully comport with current law, these tactics tend
to maximize private revenue rather than to mirror a patent’s
inherent worth.
Coupling the lack of comparators with the monetizer’s drive
to arbitrage suggests that patent pricing is shifting from the
fundamental value of the technology to the potential recovery
value from deep pocket infringers that are seeking to guard
against legal exposure. As some reports indicate, “[t]he dominant
patent assertion strategy is to leverage certain features of the
patent system—not the strength of the patent or quality of the
Diego Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 14-175, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2520125.
156 Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, FTC, Opening Remarks at the Computer
& Communications Industry Association and American Antitrust Institute
Program: Competition Law & Patent Assertion Entities: What Antitrust Enforcers Can
Do 4 (June 20, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/public_statements/competition-law-patent-assertion-entities-what-antitrust-en
forcers-can-do/130620paespeech.pdf).
157 Lauren Cohen, Umit G. Gurun & Scott Duke Kominers, Patent Trolls: Evidence
from Targeted Firms 2–3 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 15-002, 2014), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2464303.
158 Id. at 3.
159 See Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a
Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
1309, 1313 (2013) (finding that patent monetizers “overwhelmingly wait to assert their
rights until the underlying technology is stale and unlikely to be of much use to accused
infringers that independently developed the technology themselves years earlier”).

Do Not Delete

672

6/6/2015 11:02 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 18:3

technology—into royalties.”160 To the extent that this is
widespread activity, the prices set by this conduct threaten to
pull patent values away from fundamentals and into the
speculative range.161
III. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Minsky predicts that some markets, which may begin in an
ordered and self-regulating way, can become subject to
incoherence.162 This circumstance can take hold even in markets
that do not suffer from the lack of transparency and the other
difficulties that exist in the buying and selling of patents. The
prospect of an emerging patent market has the potential to
operate according to rational economic principles. However, in its
current state, it is difficult to predict whether rational economic
assumptions will govern in fact, or whether incoherence will
prevail. Moreover, it is not realistic to expect that the friction
between rational patent monetizers, who develop strategies to
maximize profit through arbitrage, will necessarily foster the
optimal environment for invention and innovation.
Whether patents or Bitcoins are subject to bubble behavior
in fact remains to be seen. Like Bitcoin currency, patent
monetization appears to lack sufficient objective tethers to
rational fundamentals. Rather than speculative hoarding, patent
monetizers use techniques that rely on timing, avoidance of high
transaction costs, uncertainty, and target selection to maximize
revenue. The most sophisticated patent entities focus on the
acquisition and assertion of high-value patents portfolios within
areas of vibrant and essential uses of patented technology, such
as electronics, communication, and social networking.163 The
private interests of monetizers, which seek to maximize
individual profit, create friction with the social benefits that
these technologies are designed to deliver. It may be that a
transparent market will ultimately resolve these issues.

160 Letter from Noreen Krall, supra note 119, at 4; Microsoft Sues Acacia over
Smartphone Patents, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/
11/20/us-microsoft-patents-idUSBRE9AJ14X20131120 (statement of David Howard,
Microsoft’s deputy general counsel) (stating that patent monetizer Acacia Research Group
is “attempting to extract payment based on litigation tactics and not the value of its
patents”).
161 Comprehensive data is difficult to obtain because such agreements are frequently
subject to confidentiality provisions. See generally Alan Schoenbaum, Hey Patent Trolls,
the FTC Has a Few Questions for You, RACKSPACE (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.rack
space.com/blog/hey-patent-trolls-the-ftc-has-a-few-questions-for-you/.
162 Minsky, supra note 3.
163 Cf. Wild, supra note 122, at 66–67 (describing a patent assertion entity’s
preference to negotiate, rather than litigate).
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Perhaps the most troubling aspect arises from a practice that
mercerizes the violation of legal rights. In this context, future
valuation will most likely be based on datasets accumulated
during the current patent assertion climate.164 If current values
are skewed from fundamentals, then future agreements will be
based on unreliable measures. The “buy low, license high”
practice may ultimately be vulnerable to the same flaw that
triggers the end of all bubbles—that is, a lack of customers who
are ready, willing, and able to pay license fees if monetization
activity reaches an unsustainable level. Rates charged to “keep
the bicycle moving forward to maintain momentum” will reach a
limit as target company profits continue to be diverted to paying
licensing fees. At a certain point in time, this practice will drive
prices above the level that a sufficient number of licensees (and,
ultimately, consumers) will pay.
The patent royalty burden on innovators is not illusory. A
recent paper estimates that the cost of the multiple patent
royalties necessary to produce a $400 smartphone is $120, which
is roughly equivalent to the cost of the components required to
manufacture the phone, illustrates its operation.165 This study
concludes, “the smartphone royalty stack across standardized
and non-standardized technology is significant, and those costs
may be undermining industry profitability.”166 As royalty
demands rise, it can be expected that industry participants will
become unwilling or unable to pay.167 The reason may be due to
any number of factors, including an overloaded royalty stack, the
innovator’s inability to obtain sufficient money to pay the rates
charged, or a push against license prices driven primarily by
arbitrage activity. Alternatively, innovation may slow as risk
adverse innovators become reluctant to add new features that, if
successful, result in high demands for patent royalties.

164 See, e.g., ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 872 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(stating that licenses deriving from litigation settlement are admissible when such
licenses are the best available evidence of a patent’s value); Tyco Healthcare Grp. LP
v. E-Z-EM, Inc., No. 2:07-CV-262(TJW), 2010 WL 774878, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2010)
(“A prior, related settlement agreement, where it exists, may be central to the fact-finder’s
determination of damages using a hypothetical negotiations analysis.”).
165 Ann Armstrong, Joseph J. Mueller & Timothy D. Syrett, The Smartphone Royalty
Stack: Surveying Royalty Demands for the Components Within Modern Smartphones 2
(May 29, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2443848.
166 Id.
167 Cf. Acacia Research Corp., Annual Report, supra note 115 (observing the potential
negative impact on the company’s patent monetization business plan if economic, credit,
or market conditions impact licensee’s ability or willingness to pay).

Do Not Delete

674

6/6/2015 11:02 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 18:3

It may be that the patent system has been subject to policy
bubble thinking.168 In part, this may be because the concept that
“[a] strong intellectual property system supports and enables the
innovation that is the lifeblood of our economy” is a
well-engrained maxim among governmental decision makers.169
That is, the patent system has benefited from a strong policy
commitment. Yet there is a mounting literature, particularly
among economists, that sheds doubt on the efficacy of patents to
facilitate change.170 As one example, economist Adam Jaffe has
concluded that there is a “disquieting” lack of evidence to support
the proposition that stronger patent laws have any significant
impact on innovation.171 However, to the degree that the
valuation becomes swayed by patent monetization, which
provides only weak support of knowledge creation, the credibility
of the system may become impacted.
Given the potential of royalty demands to chill socially
valuable activity, some intervention may be possible to provide
some guardrails on the prices that are the subject of private
agreements. Certainly, providing clear and certain guidelines for
patent valuation is one solution that might prevent speculators
from driving the cost of patents either upward or downward. As
one source asserts, “[T]he lack of transparent price signals

See supra Part I.C and accompanying text.
Press Release, The Whitehouse, Fact Sheet – Executive Actions: Answering the
President’s Call to Strengthen Our Patent System and Foster Innovation, (Feb. 20, 2014),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/02/20/fact-sheet-executive-actions-answe
ring-president-s-call-strengthen-our-p; see also, e.g., Special Message to the Congress
Proposing Patent Modernization and Reform Legislation, 1973 PUB. PAPERS 825 (Sept. 27,
1973) (observing that the nation’s “creative history” is based in part on the patent laws
that have “enormously stimulated our progress and prosperity”); SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIGHTS, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF
USEFUL ARTS: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, S. DOC.
NO. 90-5, at iii (1967) (summarizing the committee’s conclusion that the patent system
“continues to provide an essential incentive for the conduct of research and the
investment of capital”); ECON. & STATISTICS ADMIN. & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: INDUSTRIES IN FOCUS, at i (2012),
available at http://www.iprcenter.gov/reports/ipr-center-reports/intellectual-property-andthe-u.s.-economy-industries-in-focus/ (“Protecting our ideas and IP promotes innovative,
open, and competitive markets, and helps ensure that the U.S. private sector remains
America's innovation engine.”).
170 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 141 (2008) (“[D]uring the late
1990s, the aggregate costs of patents exceeded the aggregate private benefits of patents
for United States public firms outside the chemical and pharmaceutical industries.”);
Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter
2013, at 3, 7.
171 Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation and the
Innovation Process, 29 RES. POL’Y 531, 540 (2000).
168
169
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results in distorted and inconsistent incentives to produce and
commercialize new ideas.”172
To the extent that a bubble may be developing in the patent
assertion area, one question is whether there is a secondary
impact on investment that depends on the patent system to
support research and development. Stated another way, if
patents are viewed as too unpredictable to value, too volatile to
incentivize investment, or too dependent on patent monetization
entities for pricing norms, such a state of affairs may affect the
market’s willingness to invest in the type of research and
innovation that the patent system was intended to incentivize.
Thus, a bursting of a patent bubble might have immediate
second-order effects on the patent system more generally, or
perhaps other forms of intellectual property.
At a minimum, prices paid in the price assertion markets
should be cabined from affecting royalty rates used as
comparators in other areas of patent law. As one example, such
prices should be strictly limited, if not eliminated, as a
foundational support of expert testimony about established
royalty rates for jury proceedings or for other areas of patent
licensing practice. To the extent that patent assertion valuation
swings, such safeguards would minimize the spillover effects in
other areas of investment. To the extent that there is a rapid
change in the monetization sector, safeguards should be in place
to disconnect these effects from ties to other areas and to help
preserve the patent’s system core role in incentivizing invention
and innovation.

172 Joshua S. Gans & Scott Stern, Is There a Market for Ideas?, 19 INDUS. & CORP.
CHANGE 805, 806 (2010).
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